Guest Column | November 19, 2026

Keeping Clinical Trial Supply Moving During A Cyber Incident

By Bob Bilbruck, Captjur

IT Technician, Artificial Intelligence, Big Data Mining, Neural Network Project-GettyImages-2215423741

The product is in the depot. The site needs a shipment. The courier has capacity. But the system that authorizes the order is unavailable, and nobody can confirm whether the inventory report downloaded yesterday still reflects what is on the shelf.

Should the shipment move?

That hypothetical situation captures the operational problem cybersecurity creates for clinical trial supply. Having investigational product available is only part of the equation. Teams also need reliable information and authorized processes to determine what can move, where it should go, and whether it remains suitable for use.

Clinical supply depends on connections between forecasting tools, inventory platforms, interactive response technology (IRT) and randomization and trial supply management (RTSM) systems, temperature monitoring, couriers, and depots. Those connections make routine operations more efficient. They also allow an incident at one provider to interrupt activities across several organizations.

A useful preparedness plan starts with the decisions people will have to make when those connections fail.

Understand What Would Actually Stop

“System unavailable” is too broad a description to guide a supply response.

An outage affecting a forecasting application might leave teams able to execute previously approved shipments while assessing future demand manually. An outage affecting IRT/RTSM could interrupt the workflows used to manage treatment assignment, dispensing, or resupply. A compromised identity service could prevent access to several otherwise functioning applications.

Each situation creates different constraints.

Sponsors should map critical supply activities to the systems, records, people, and providers they depend on. Start with concrete tasks: approving a shipment, confirming available stock, reviewing a temperature excursion, receiving product at a site, and reconciling accountability records.

For each task, ask what would happen if the supporting system disappeared tomorrow. Could the activity continue through an approved alternative? What information would be missing? Who could authorize the next step?

This exercise often exposes dependencies that an application inventory misses. A depot may have a continuity plan, but the sponsor’s approval workflow may still require access to an unavailable portal. A courier may continue transporting shipments while its tracking interface is down. A temperature logger may keep recording even though nobody can access its cloud dashboard.

Those distinctions determine the response.

Treat Availability And Integrity As Separate Problems

Ransomware can make systems and records inaccessible. An incident can also raise questions about whether accessible information is accurate.

That second problem can be harder to recognize. An inventory screen may look normal even when unauthorized changes are suspected. A shipment instruction may arrive through a familiar email account that has been compromised. Restored records may omit transactions completed after the last usable backup.

Supply teams therefore need to establish two things: which services remain available and which information remains trustworthy.

During an incident, record the last known reliable state of critical information, the evidence supporting that assessment, and any unresolved uncertainty. A timestamped export can help establish a starting position, but its age and completeness matter. Yesterday’s inventory report cannot establish today’s available balance without accounting for subsequent receipts, allocations, shipments, and adjustments.

Where integrity is uncertain, teams should avoid filling gaps with assumptions. A physically present kit is not automatically available for shipment or dispensing. Its status, allocation, expiry, and relevant quality conditions still need to be established through authorized procedures.

Look Beyond The Sponsor’s Network

Clinical supply resilience depends on organizations the sponsor does not directly control.

Depots, IRT/RTSM providers, packaging partners, couriers, and temperature monitoring services exchange information through portals, interfaces, files, and email. Shared access arrangements and automated integrations can create routes for unauthorized activity or make an outage more disruptive.

Provider assessments should examine how those connections work. Which accounts can change orders or inventory? Are privileges limited to the work each user or integration needs to perform? How is remote access controlled? What happens when an integration fails or sends conflicting information?

Continuity discussions should be equally specific.

A sponsor needs to know how a provider will communicate if its usual email or service portal is unavailable. It should understand what functions the provider can sustain, which subcontractors are involved, and how records generated during the interruption will be recovered and reconciled.

Recovery commitments also need context. Restoring a provider’s application does not necessarily restore the complete workflow between that provider, the sponsor and the site.

Build A Usable Inventory Fallback

An emergency spreadsheet is useful only if people understand its purpose, limitations, and controls.

A continuity inventory record should contain the information needed to support defined decisions. Depending on the study and workflow, that could include product or kit identifiers, lot information, location, expiry, quality status, allocations, recent movements, and the time the record was captured.

Access should remain restricted to appropriate personnel. Fallback records must preserve blinding and avoid unnecessary disclosure of participant information.

Once manual operations begin, changes need a controlled record. Every receipt, transfer, shipment, return, or status change should identify who performed it, when it occurred, what supported the action, and which approval was required.

Teams also need one designated record for coordinating temporary operations. Several independently maintained spreadsheets can quickly produce conflicting balances.

The purpose is to establish a defensible account of what happened during the interruption so that people can make authorized decisions and reconcile those decisions later.

Keep Temperature Oversight Working

Loss of a temperature monitoring dashboard does not necessarily mean loss of temperature control. It does mean the team must establish what evidence remains available.

Sponsors and providers should understand whether devices retain local readings, how those readings can be retrieved, and what happens to alerts when connectivity fails. They should also know whether alternative monitoring arrangements are suitable for the storage location or shipment concerned.

During an outage, missing telemetry should be treated as missing evidence. It does not, by itself, establish either acceptable conditions or a temperature excursion.

Where suitability cannot be established, product should be managed under the applicable quality procedures, including holds or quarantine where appropriate. Qualified personnel should assess the available evidence before disposition.

Temporary monitoring arrangements need clear ownership. Someone must know which locations or shipments require additional checks, how often to perform them, where to record results, and when to escalate a concern.

Prioritize Resupply Around Participant Need

A disruption can turn routine replenishment into a series of urgent choices.

Clinical supply teams should establish which sites face the earliest meaningful shortages, using verified stock information and appropriate study information. Scheduled visits, resupply lead times, expiry constraints, and the time needed for shipment approvals can all affect priority.

That assessment should involve the relevant clinical and study teams. A supply team should not independently change protocol requirements, treatment assignments, or dispensing arrangements to compensate for an outage.

Sites need practical instructions early. Tell them how to report stock, flag an approaching shortage, and reach an authorized contact. Make clear which existing procedures remain in effect and which temporary procedures have been approved.

Alternative depots or couriers can help only if the necessary arrangements are already suitable for the activity. Qualification, shipping conditions, documentation, and applicable country requirements do not disappear because the primary route is unavailable.

Any emergency shipment process should preserve the controls needed to prevent incorrect allocation, duplicate orders, and unauthorized release.

Give The Incident Team Clear Decision Rights

Cybersecurity, IT, quality, and clinical supply will view the same incident from different perspectives.

Cybersecurity personnel need to contain the intrusion and preserve evidence. IT needs to restore services safely. Clinical supply needs to understand stock and shipment consequences. Quality needs to assess product status, deviations, and the acceptability of temporary processes.

These responsibilities should meet in a defined incident structure.

The plan should identify who can activate a fallback workflow, approve emergency shipments, authorize inventory adjustments, and accept a recovered system for operational use. It should also establish how unresolved disagreements are escalated.

Containment decisions can affect supply. Disconnecting an integration may interrupt orders; reconnecting it prematurely may create further exposure. Clinical supply needs a voice in understanding those consequences, while cybersecurity retains responsibility for assessing the technical threat.

Maintain a shared decision log with owners, times, supporting evidence, and open questions. Establish an alternative communication channel before an incident, since the organization’s usual collaboration tools may be affected too.

Test Against A Real Supply Deadline

A tabletop exercise becomes useful when participants have to work through an operational problem.

Consider a scenario in which IRT/RTSM is unavailable, a depot cannot confirm recent allocations, and several sites expect resupply within days. Then introduce a conflicting shipment message or a gap in temperature records.

Ask participants to demonstrate how they would obtain reliable stock information, identify urgent sites, authorize permissible actions, and document what happened.

The exercise should expose how long those steps take. If obtaining a controlled inventory extract takes two days, that delay belongs in the continuity assessment.

It should also test the period after restoration. Can the team reconstruct manual transactions? Can it distinguish an unprocessed order from one already shipped? Can sites confirm receipt without triggering duplicate activity?

Assign owners and deadlines to the weaknesses identified, then retest the parts that failed.

Recover The Supply Process As Well As The Technology

A successful system restart is a milestone. Clinical supply recovery still requires reconciliation.

Orders created before and during the outage may overlap. Inventory balances may exclude manual movements. Temperature records may need review. Accountability records may contain discrepancies that require investigation.

Before routine automation resumes, relevant teams should confirm which records have been reconciled, which exceptions remain, and what restrictions are necessary. Quality and system owners should define the evidence required for their respective approvals.

Recovery performance should be measured in operational terms: time to establish reliable inventory, time to identify sites at risk, time to resume authorized shipments, and time to resolve material discrepancies.

Those measures make preparedness tangible.

The strongest continuity plan gives people enough reliable information, clear authority, and workable procedures to manage supply under difficult conditions. Its value becomes apparent when a site needs product and the usual system cannot provide an answer.

About The Author:

Bob Bilbruck is CEO of Captjur and an expert in cybersecurity, technology strategy, and operational resilience. He advises businesses on the risks that emerge when interconnected systems, outside providers, and critical business processes depend on one another, with an emphasis on continuity planning and organizational preparedness.

Through Captjur Labs and its CREST Consortium, Bilbruck brings together partner companies and clients to participate in and help lead vertical thought leadership councils. These councils provide a forum for examining industry challenges, sharing expertise, and exploring practical approaches to technology adoption and risk management.

In this article, Bilbruck applies that perspective to cybersecurity risks in clinical trial supply, examining how system outages, compromised data, and third-party incidents can disrupt inventory visibility, shipment coordination, and product traceability. His focus is on helping organizations prepare for interruptions and coordinate recovery across cybersecurity, IT, quality, and supply operations. www.captjur.com/labs